University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

4-24-2014

The U.S. Department of State Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives: What does the U.S.
engage when they engage `religion'?
Belgica Marisol Cucalon
University of South Florida, bmcucalon@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Religion Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Cucalon, Belgica Marisol, "The U.S. Department of State Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives: What does the U.S. engage
when they engage `religion'?" (2014). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5207

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The U.S. Department of State Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives:
What does the U.S. engage when they engage ‘religion’?

by

Belgica M. Cucalon

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in Religious Studies
Department of Religious Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Michael Dejonge, Ph.D.
Danny L. Jorgensen, Ph.D.
James Cavendish, Ph.D.
Date of Approval:
April 24, 2014

Keywords: humanistic, religious pluralism, theoretical frameworks, foreign policy
Copyright © 2014, Belgica M. Cucalon

DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my hardworking mother, Marisol Hortencia. Her fierce
dedication to me and my three older brothers has been my constant inspiration in life. For all
the struggles she has faced for us, and for all the love she shares with us, I dedicate all my
education to her. Te amo.
I also dedicate this thesis to Richard—a brother and a great friend who has always
supported and encouraged me. Thank you for taking care of your little sister so well. Oh, the
humanity of it all.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
When I begin to look back on my academic career it is easy to recognize that I am the
product of people who have believed in me along the way. From the grade school teacher who
kindly bought my school uniforms to the high school chorus director who always drove me
home after rehearsal, I have been blessed with educators who have taken an active interest in
my success. I acknowledge them all in my heart and am forever grateful for their love and
kindness.
In my journey at the University of South Florida, I am indebted to all the professors who
have helped me explore my varying interests along the years. I am most grateful for the
professors who taught and encouraged me to always ask questions, a skill I was too timid to
explore for several years. While my successes are not limited to the following individuals, I am
particularly grateful for their contributions in my academic career.
First, I would like to express deep gratitude to Dr. Michael DeJonge for years of
patience and encouragement. Without both, this thesis may have never been finished.
Whether it was allowing me to speedily babble an assortment of thoughts and then helping me
work through them, or enduring my odd sense of time, you have been a great professor to me.
I thank you for taking part in my academic adventure with genius and humor.
I would like to thank my committee members Dr. Danny Jorgensen and Dr. James
Cavendish, whose knowledge has greatly added to my own over the years. Thank you for your
enthusiasm for this project and your helpful suggestions. Thank you for being part of the

journey that led me to this. You have been valuable sources to me and I will remain forever
grateful.
I would also like to thank Mr. Dell DeChant for inspiring me to pursue a career in
religious studies. Your passion and love for the academic study of religion, as well as for your
students, has been a constant source of inspiration to me. Thank you for being my greatest
cheerleader; your encouragement and kindness has always gone above and beyond. Thank
you for introducing me to what is now my life’s passion. Thank you for being my mentor. I will
always remember our conversations and our times feeding the ducks.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. ii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT TO THIS STUDY ........................................................... 1
METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................4
AIMS OF THIS STUDY .....................................................................................................6
OUTLINE OF THESIS ...................................................................................................... 7
CHAPTER TWO: THE DISCOURSE ON FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES ...........................................8
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................8
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION .................................................................................. 10
RELIGION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ..................................................................... 14
Office of International Religious Freedom ......................................................... 16
Religious Engagement at the State Department ............................................... 18
THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY
INITIATIVES ............................................................................................................ 22
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 25
CHAPTER THREE: A HUMANISTIC THEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM .........................26
A HUMANISTIC APPROACH: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?..................................................28
COMPARATIVE RELIGION AS ‘THEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM’ ................... 31
A HUMANISTIC THEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AS POLITICAL
STRATEGY: OBSCURING THE FACTS ................................................................... 34
Taking religion seriously .................................................................................... 36
The problem of religious pluralism .................................................................... 39
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 43
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................46
MOVING FORWARD .....................................................................................................49
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 54

i

ABSTRACT
In August of 2013 the U.S. State Department launched the Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives with the objective to foster and promote religious engagements in
foreign diplomacy. The language used by the architects and proponents of the initiative
suggests that even though religion can be a source of great conflict, religion is also a powerful
force for good capable of mitigating conflict and fostering progress. The present optimistic
belief of American foreign diplomats that religious engagement will foster beneficial
partnerships capable of advancing U.S. foreign interests has led scholars to pose the question,
“what will the U.S. engage when it engages religion?” This thesis argues that the language
used in the promotion of faith-based initiatives exhibits a commitment to a humanistic
theology of religious pluralism. Further, this thesis explains that a humanistic theology of
religious pluralism limits religious engagement. In other words, the OFBCI will engage with
religious groups only in so far as they fit their definition of religion.

ii

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT TO THIS STUDY
In August of 2013 the U.S. Department of State launched the Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives with the purpose of engaging religious communities abroad. During the
official launch press conference, Secretary of State John Kerry’s speech urged American
governmental staff working in foreign nations to go out, learn about, and engage religious
leaders, actors and organizations in beneficial partnerships. The hope of the architects and
proponents of the OFBCI is that in the process of engaging religious communities, American
diplomacy abroad will be able to better confront the “challenges of simply understanding
people.” 1 Secretary Kerry’s call for understanding was then mirrored in a speech by Shaun
Casey, the head of the OFBCI. Casey’s remarks stirred the audience’s approval for the initiative
by stating that “it’s essential for the United States to understand [religious groups] and to
bring them into our diplomacy and development efforts.” 2 Finally, the press conference ended
with praise from Melissa Rogers, the Director of the White House OFBCI. Ms. Rogers
applauded religious efforts to provide social services as well as the continuing trend of
collaboration between government and religious groups. In this way, the U.S. Department of

1

From the State Department’s transcript of the Remarks at the Launch of the Office of Faith-Based Community
Initiatives press conference in Washington D.C,. on August 7, 2013.
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212781.htm
2
Ibid.
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State OFBCI was introduced with the mission of engaging religious organizations abroad and
partnering with them in humanitarian interventions.
The creation of the OFBCI has raised the interest of scholars in various disciplines
because the U.S. State Department has traditionally shown an aversion to engaging religion in
foreign diplomacy. In fact, it has often been accused of suffering from a stout “secular
fundamentalism.” 3 With the exception of its mission to foster religious freedom abroad—an
agenda undertaken by the Office of International Religious Freedom in 1998—the State
Department has been wary and suspicious of any religious organizations’ interest in foreign
policy. Its current agenda to improve foreign relations and foreign policy through religious
engagement is, then, labelled a ‘novel’ commitment. In so far as the Office is newly formed,
this is true. However, prior to John Kerry becoming Secretary of State and establishing the
OFBCI, former U.S. Secretaries of State, including Madeleine Albright and Hillary Clinton, had
begun to engage religious leaders and activists in conversation. 4 More importantly, the
rhetoric propounded by the Office is inherited from recent decades of collaboration between
the U.S. government and faith-based organizations.
The OFBCI at the State Department is the most recent example of the changing
dynamics of religious organizations in American politics. The last several decades have seen a
surge in faith-based initiatives throughout the United States—from the growth in Alinsky-style
social advocacy to the institutionalization of faith-based initiatives during the Bush

3

Judd Birdsall, “The State Department's Great Leap Faithward,” HuffPost Politics, August 13, 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judd-birdsall/state-department-faith-based-office_b_3744290.html, accessed
December 6, 2013.
4
See Madeleine Korbel Albright, William Woodward, and Bill Clinton, The mighty and the almighty: Reflections on
America, God, and WorldAffairs (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).
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administration. In 2001, the Bush administration established the first institutionalized
collaboration between government and religious groups—the White House Office of FaithBased and Community Initiatives. The apparent success of these faith-based initiatives has led
to the growing inclusion of religion in U.S. political discourse. In fact, recent studies in political
science have shown that the staunch separationist culture which has heretofore been a marker
of the United States government has gradually given way to a culture of accommodation and
collaboration. 5 In addition, rather than labeling religion anachronistic and dismissing it from
political discourse as has been the custom in American politics, religion is now understood to
be a powerful force for change and action. Apart from constitutional debates about churchstate relations, the cooperation with religious groups in U.S. democracy has reached a level of
legitimacy unlike in any other period of American history. The creation of the Department of
State OFBCI is, in short, the foreign expansion of a domestically normalized partnership
between religious groups and government agencies.
The formation of the OFBCI at the State Department has led scholars to debate its
inherent assumptions concerning ‘religion.’ While there is considerable excitement about the
prospects of such an office fostering relationships with religious groups in foreign countries,
scholars question the fundamental claims that such an office makes. After all, to engage
religion globally presupposes that there is a universal understanding of ‘religion’ to which all
parties can agree. Moreover, the idea that there is—as sociologist Rebecca Sager puts it, a

5

See Jo Renee Formicola, Mary C. Segers, and, Paul Weber, Faith-Based Initiatives and the Bush Administration:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Rebecca Sager, Faith,
Politics, and Power: The Politics of Faith-Based Initiative (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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“one-size fits all faith-based initiative” is extremely problematic. 6 These and other
reservations about the State Department OFBCI have been introduced by scholars in fields
such as religious studies, international affairs, political science and sociology. In November of
2013, Georgetown University’s Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs held a
panel evaluating the OFBCI and debating the role of religious engagements in foreign policy. 7
The popular and well-respected intellectual blog, the Immanent Frame, held an online
roundtable of seventeen scholars to discuss the prospects, assumptions and implications of the
new office; the forum was titled, “Engaging religion at the State Department.” 8 Less than six
months after the creation of the OFBCI, scholars have begun to analyze and criticize the
fundamental claims and objectives of the office.
In short, the present optimistic belief of American foreign diplomats that religious
engagements will foster beneficial partnerships that will advance U.S. foreign policy interests
has led scholars to pose the question: what will the U.S. engage when they engage religion
abroad?
METHODOLOGY
This thesis will use an interdisciplinary approach to evaluate the U.S. State Department
OFBCI. Since the State’s OFBCI was just inaugurated in August of 2013—less than a year before

6

Rebecca Sager, Faith, Politics and Power: The Politics of Faith-Based Initiatives (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2010).
7
Anthony Arend , Michael Kessler, et. al, “Evaluating the State Department's Office of Faith-Based Community”
(video of a forum held at the Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs video, November 11, 2013),
accessed March 20, 2014, http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/events/evaluating-the-state-department-soffice-of-faith-based-community-initiatives
8
“Engaging Religion at the Department of State,” The Immanent Frame Blog, July 30, 2013. Accessed November
20, 2013. http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2013/07/30/engaging-religion-at-the-department-of-state/, accessed September
20, 2013.
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this study—there is a scarcity in academic and governmental resources. Because of lack of
official mandates that specifically describe the methods the OFBCI will use to engage religion,
most of the sources will come from news releases and press conferences, official statements
on the State’s website, and the recommendations from the Religion and Foreign Policy
Working group. These sources will represent the major proponents of the State OFBCI,
including President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and Special Advisor to the State
OFBCI Shaun Casey. Research about the White House OFBCI, an office focused on U.S.
domestic faith-based partnerships primarily in the social service sector, will also be used to
support this thesis in so far as its history may have something to show concerning
institutionalized religious engagement in U.S. politics.
All of the available sources for the Department of State OFBCI are theoretically thin.
However, this thesis will argue that the lack of an explicit theoretical basis for the OFBCI does
not denote a lack of theoretical assumptions. 9 As such, this thesis will draw upon various
concepts in the academic study of religion to help identify the assumptions and implications of
the State OFBCI. Particularly, since this thesis is interested in the politics of religion, the
concepts within the critical approach in religious studies, exemplified by Russell McCutcheon,
will help identify the possible religious engagements that will come from this new office. In
other words, scholarship of the critical approach which theorizes about categories, like
religion, will be applied.

9

This thesis is a work of religious studies. As such, the word theory and its variations is consistent with its use in
the field of religious studies.
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AIMS OF THIS STUDY
This thesis aims to contribute a theoretical model for the U.S. State Department’s
OFBCI. 10 It is focused on interpreting the language of the OFBCI in order to understand what
the U.S. government means by ‘religion’ in global religious engagements, and by extension,
what it is committed to achieving. In other words, it is interested in the question: What does
the U.S. State Department OFBCI engage when they engage religion? It is not the purpose of
this thesis to partake in the theoretical debates regarding church-state relations and the
establishment clause. This is not a study troubled with questions about the legality or
constitutionality of institutionalized faith-based initiatives. While many studies are available
concerning those issues and they are a subject worth study, those debates tend to exist solely
within the realms of political philosophy. In addition, there is little agreement on how the
Establishment Clause is relevant in foreign affairs.
This thesis endeavors to take a multidisciplinary approach to faith-based initiatives. As
such, it will present scholarship from religious studies, political science and sociology. It will
explore what the OFBCI means by ‘religion’ and what engaging religious communities consist
of within the confines of U.S. foreign policy. This thesis will argue that from the language used
by the representatives and proponents of this Office, much can be inferred about its
theoretical assumptions. Particularly, I will argue that the language used by the State OFBCI
indicates a commitment to a humanistic theology of religious pluralism. This will be explained
and defended in chapter three.

6

OUTLINE OF THESIS
This chapter presented an introduction to the topic of this study. The following chapter
will illustrate the current conception, within American politics, that religion is valuable,
distinctly humanitarian, and worth collaborating with. It will introduce the discourse on faithbased initiatives as presented by the Obama administration and the State Department,
particularly in the years leading up to the launch of the State OFBCI. It will end by presenting
the culmination of that discourse—the creation of the State Department OFBCI and its mission
and goals. The second chapter is meant to present the language used to promote religious
engagements in our foreign policy. Chapter three will, then, critically engage the language
revealed in chapter two. It will explain and defend my thesis that the State Department OFBCI
is committed to a humanistic theology of religious pluralism. Additionally, it will provide a
critique of the use of a humanistic theology of religious pluralism as a political strategy in foreign
policy. By extension, this chapter will seek to respond to the question: what will the U.S. State
Department Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives engage when it engages
religion? The concluding chapter will offer some suggestions as to how scholarship on religion
and foreign policy, and by extension the State Department OFBCI, should move forward.

7

CHAPTER TWO:
THE DISCOURSE ON FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES
INTRODUCTION
While 2013 marked the official institutionalization in our foreign affairs agency of an
office concerned with religious engagement, the twenty-first century is distinguished by a
series of political measures in that direction. This chapter will introduce a more nuanced
understanding of religious engagement in our foreign affairs agency—the State Department—
by presenting the discourse on faith-based initiatives in the years leading into the creation of
the State OFBCI. In other words, it will present the language used to promote and pursue
religious engagement in the U.S. government.
First, an illustration of the Obama administration’s attitude and convictions concerning
faith will help recognize the contemporary political culture which influenced the creation of the
State Department OFBCI. More importantly, the “political theology” of Obama— concerned
with domestic faith-based and government collaborations—will distinguish the common
language characteristic of the State Department OFBCI. Next, the many measures taken
within the State Department to engage religion, prior to the creation of the OFBCI, will be
presented. This will briefly address the resistance the State Department had previously
maintained regarding religion in foreign policy. An example of this resistance will be illustrated
by the failures of the institutional predecessor to religious engagement in the State
Department—the Office of International Religious Freedom (1996).
8

Following a brief examination of the resistance to religion at the State Department, the
shift towards religious engagement will be demonstrated beginning with the work of former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This will include an account of her actions and contributions
particularly in the designation of a Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group (2011). Among
the many recommendations from the working group was the proposal of an OFBCI at the
State Department. Finally, the current Secretary of State John Kerry, the special advisor to the
OFBCI Shaun Casey, and most importantly, the objectives of the OFBCI will be presented in
the context of this more nuanced account of religious engagement in American foreign affairs.
Because the State Department OFBCI is a recently crafted office, there is very little in
terms of official reports and documents. The available documents alone could not provide a
thorough understanding of its assumptions and implications. For this reason, this chapter relies
upon the historical retrospective of the various figures and cases selected to present a
discourse on faith-based initiatives. The language presented here is the most frequently and
consistently used throughout the years. Careful consideration was given to selecting the most
relevant and reliable sources. However, while the chosen are rich examples, this topic is not
limited to them.
In summary, this chapter will demonstrate the contemporary political culture that
warranted the creation of the State OFBCI. More importantly, it will reveal how the language
used by the proponents shaped the discourse on faith-based initiatives that has culminated in
the pursuit of religious engagements in foreign policy. While the State OFBCI is a new office in
foreign policy, its agenda is not so novel in the U.S. government. This chapter will demonstrate

9

how the domestic faith-based initiative expanded into a commitment to religious engagement
abroad.
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
We know that faith and values can be a source of strength in our own lives. That’s what
it’s been to me. And that’s what it is to so many Americans. But it can also be
something more. It can be the foundation of a new project of American renewal. And
that’s the kind of effort I intend to lead as president of the United States. 11
During the presidential campaign of 2008, then-Senator Barack Obama launched a
unique grassroots campaign strategy that conjured the imagery, among many things, of the
power of faith-based organizations. Trained as a faith-based community organizer in Chicago,
Obama recognized that collaborating with religious organizations had tremendous potential in
community revival and participatory politics for progressive change. 12 He believes that faith
entails a responsibility to the community and to others to help resolve some of the great
injustices of our time—like global poverty, global warming, and the many human rights
violations across the globe. Following in the footsteps of former President George W. Bush,
Obama promised to expand the White House OFBCI to maximize that potential. However, he
also committed to resolve the many issues and satisfy the unfulfilled promises of the Bush
OFBCI.
Departing from the rhetoric of the Bush administration, Obama clarified many of the
former assumptions of the faith-based initiative as well as increased the agenda. Consistent
with the findings of sociologists like Chaves, Obama declared that he had no illusions about the
11

“Obama Delivers Speech on Faith in America,” New York Times, July 1, 2008. Accessed March 6, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/us/politics/01obama-text.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0
12
Obama ’08 pamphlet, “Partnering with communities of faith.” Accessed March 6, 2014.
http://obama.3cdn.net/c2c74198bb57fc007c_e906mvllj.pdf
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extent of faith-based potential. In other words, he made no assertions that faith-based
organizations could provide better service than secular ones, or that they were an alternative
to them. He also—as a solution to the many problems of proselytizing, partisan interests, and
exclusion discovered of the Bush OFBCI—indicated that his initiative would be better regulated
and more inclusive. He would require that these initiatives demonstrate successful results. In
addition, he recognized that the rhetoric of ‘leveling the playing field’ had been wholly
unfulfilled and that faith-based initiatives remained extremely underfunded. Regrettably, “the
smaller congregations and community groups that were supposed to be empowered ended up
getting short-changed.” 13 Once elected President, Obama and his administration launched the
White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships with many of the needed
changes. 14
As promised in his presidential campaign, the launch of the Obama White House OFBCI
featured a series of changes that were meant to honor the inclusive spirit of our country. In a
clear effort to represent the religious pluralism of America, the Obama White House OFBCI
included a President’s Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships. This
Council is a deliberately diverse assembly of secular and religious non-profit leaders committed
to partnerships with governments for change.15 Members of the Council have included
religious leaders from various faith traditions—Orthodox Judaism, Greek Orthodoxy, Islam,
Seventh Day Adventism, Baptists, Humanistic Buddhism, Latter Day Saints, Evangelical

13

“Obama Delivers Speech on Faith in America,” New York Times, July 1, 2008. Accessed March 6, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/us/politics/01obama-text.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0
14
The acronym OFBCI will continue to be used.
15
Gaston Enrique Espinosa, “Barack Obama’s Political Theology: Pluralism, Deliberative Democracy, and the
Christian Faith,” Political Theology Vol. 13 Issue 5 (Oct. 2012), p610-633.

11

Lutherans, and many more. These leaders and the communities they represent work
collaboratively to draft recommendations to the President on how to move forward on social
issues and public policy.
For Obama, democracy is strengthened by diversity. He encourages faith-based
organizations to collaborate in interfaith coalitions and discover common ground, rather than
be divided by multiplicity. The official OFBCI website quotes Obama as saying, “the particular
faith that motivates each of us can promote a greater good for all of us. Instead of driving us
apart, our varied beliefs can bring us together to feed the hungry and comfort the afflicted; to
make peace where there is strife and rebuild what has broken; to lift up those who have fallen
on hard times.” 16 In other words, all faiths have a common concern with the greater good.
According to Gaston Espinosa in his article “Barack Obama’s Political Theology,”
Obama is highly committed to a pluralistic deliberative democracy. 17 This means that pluralism
is beneficial to democracy as long as it mediated for the common good. Based on Obama’s
autobiography The Audacity of Hope (2006), Espinosa argues that Obama’s political theology is
grounded on the belief that religiously motivated people must proportionately compromise for
the common good. In other words, “translate their religious concerns and vision for American
public life into universal rather than religion-specific values, which must be subject to debate,
amenable to reason, and applicable to people of all faiths and lifestyles or no faith at all.” 18

16

“Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships,” The White House: President Barack Obama. Accessed
March 6, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp/about
17
Gaston Enrique Espinosa, “Barack Obama’s Political Theology: Pluralism, Deliberative Democracy, and the
Christian Faith,” Political Theology Vol. 13 Issue 5 (Oct. 2012), p610-633.
18
Gaston Enrique Espinosa, “Barack Obama’s Political Theology: Pluralism, Deliberative Democracy, and the
Christian Faith,” Political Theology Vol. 13 Issue 5 (Oct. 2012), p610-633.
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President Obama’s speeches have contended that the common ground in all religions—
the universal values—are the aspirations for the common good. During the 2008 campaign, he
declared that “if we’re going to end genocide and stop the scourge of HIV/AIDS, we need
people of faith on Capitol Hill talking about how these challenges don’t just represent a
security crisis or a humanitarian crisis, but a moral crisis as well.” 19 Similarly, in a speech given
at the 2014 National Prayer Breakfast he affirmed the same sentiment; “brave men and
women of faith have challenged our conscience and brought us closer to our founding ideals,
from the abolition of slavery to civil rights, workers’ rights...” 20 He then followed those words
by quoting verses from the Bible, the Torah, and the Qur’an to illustrate the qualities of a
“good Samaritan.”
Since the 2008 election, the Obama administration has continued to foster faith-based
initiatives. In most of his speeches, the President continues to shape the discourse on faithbased initiatives. Unlike the Bush OFBCI, the Obama initiative is unique in its effort to honor
pluralism through deliberately diverse partnerships. These partnerships aim to cultivate
solidarity by engaging religions through common, universal values. Obama came into office
strongly believing that ignoring religion is “bad politics.” Secretary of State John Kerry will
mirror this conviction in the launch of the State Department OFBCI by quoting the now
popular political refrain, “we ignore religion at our peril.” 21

19

“Obama Delivers Speech on Faith in America,” New York Times, July 1, 2008. Accessed March 6, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/us/politics/01obama-text.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0
20
Obama’s speech at the National prayer breakfast February 6, 2014 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/02/06/remarks-president-national-prayer-breakfast
21
From the State Department’s transcript of the Remarks at the Launch of the Office of Faith-Based Community
Initiatives press conference in Washington D.C., August 7, 2013. Accessed November 20, 2014.
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212781.htm
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RELIGION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
As the oldest and most distinguished of the U.S. government executive agencies, the
State Department is responsible for “policy formulation respecting international issues,
implementation of policy and the conduct of foreign relations, and coordination of major
overseas programs and activities.” 22 The protection and promotion of American interests at
the global level is achieved through the U.S. State Department and its foreign diplomatic
projects. It continuously adapts its approach to international relations in order to meet
contemporary demands and needs. The rise of nation states and the force of globalization,
with all of its tensions and conflicts, have made foreign diplomacy an increasingly demanding
activity.
The United States government has had to expand its approach to foreign policy to
include commitments it previously deemed irrelevant to international relations. The recent
institutionalized commitment to religious engagements demonstrated by the creation of the
OFBCI indicates a shift in the political culture of American foreign diplomacy. In the United
States government, the domestic shift from separation to collaboration with religious
organizations has been, arguably, completed. After all, the Obama administration is strongly
supportive of faith-based partnerships. However, the State Department has continuously
resisted—until now—the faith-based initiatives established by its domestic counterparts.

22

Elmer Plischke, U.S. State Department: A reference history, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999),
461.
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Many former diplomats have accused the Department of State of “secular
fundamentalism” or “religion avoidance syndrome.” 23 Because, while by 2012 twelve
executive branch agencies had established versions of the White House OFBCI, the State
Department had not.24 In U.S. Department of State: A Reference History, a 700+ page book
containing a thorough history of the Department, religion did not even make it into the
index.25 Historically, the State Department has been adamantly committed to presenting a
secular approach to policy formulation. Nonetheless, real-world events like 9/11, the so-called
Arab Spring, and continuing sectarian conflicts abroad have necessitated improving
engagement with religion in foreign diplomacy.
Despite conventional wisdom that asserts that the 2013 launch of the OFBCI marked
the year that the State Department began to “get religion,” the first decades of the twentyfirst century illustrate its shift towards religious engagement. The OFBCI is the culmination of
the discourse on faith-based initiatives, and more generally, religion, which has been nurtured
for several decades now. Two years after the Charitable Choice Act (1996) changed the
relationship of government and faith-based initiatives, the Clinton administration passed the
International Religious Freedom Act (1998). The IRFA opened an Office in the State
Department aimed at combatting religious persecution and promoting religious freedom

23

Judd Birdsall, “The State Department's Great Leap Faithward,” HuffPost Politics, August 13, 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judd-birdsall/state-department-faith-based-office_b_3744290.html, accessed
December 6, 2013.
24
Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group, “Ensuring the Opportunity for Mutual Counsel and Collaboration: A
White Paper of the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group of the Secretary of State’s Strategic Dialogue with
Civil Society,” October 16, 2012. Accessed November 20, 2013.
http://globalengage.org/content/1300_Religion__Foreign_Policy_Working_Group_Submitted_WP_16Oct2012.pd
f
25
Elmer Plischke, U.S. State Department: A reference history, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999).
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abroad. Years later, during her term as Secretary of State (2009-2013), Hillary Clinton
developed a series of forums, dialogues, and working groups to advance conversation about
religious engagement in foreign policy. In 2013, the recommendations of the Religion and
Foreign Policy Working Group were realized by Secretary of State John Kerry in the launch of
the State OFBCI. The State Department had finally developed an official mechanism for
engaging with religious communities.
Office of International Religious Freedom
The Office of International Religious Freedom in the State Department, along with the
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, was created in accordance with
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. With the leadership of the Ambassador-atLarge for International Religious Freedom, a currently vacant position, the office pursues four
major objectives:
Promote freedom of religion and conscience throughout the world as a fundamental
right and a source of stability for all countries;
Assist emerging democracies in implementing freedom of religion and conscience;
Assist religious and human rights NGOs in promoting religious freedom;
Identify and denounce regimes that are severe persecutors on the basis of religious
belief. 26
The promotion of religious freedom is based on the belief that it is a matter of national
security. According to its proponents, the violation of the human right to religious freedom
leads to sectarian strife and violence. Freedom of religion is a necessary ingredient for the
promotion of successful development and democracy abroad. As a result, part of the mandate
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of the IRF Act of 1998 requires that the USCIRF submit an annual report on the standing of
religious freedom around the world. This report identifies countries with severe violations of
religious freedom and recommends the classification known as Country of Particular Concern.
In 2013, for example, the USCIRF recommended that the Secretary of State designate 15
CPCs. 27 In order to ascertain and report the situation of religious freedom in these countries,
the OIRF must interact with religious communities around the world.
Although the IRF Act does not include religious engagement as an official mandate, the
OIRF is involved in engaging with religious communities. According to a report by the
President’s Advisory Council, “the required annual International Religious Freedom report has
also nurtured a corps of foreign service officers who have developed strong connections with
religious communities in countries across the globe.” 28 As such, it is arguably the first office in
the State Department concerned with religion. It demonstrates how, as early as 1998, the
State recognized that the obstruction of religious freedom led to conflict. More specifically,
that religious freedom was necessary for development and conflict resolution. Despite the fact
that religious engagement in the OIRF is limited to advancing religious freedom, the office
symbolizes a shift—albeit a grudging shift—in the political culture of the State Department.
Since the inception of the OIRF, the State Department has been criticized for its weak
commitment to the objectives of the office. According to international relations scholar
Thomas Farr, “the implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act did not involve
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any serious attempt to ‘advance religious freedom’ as the law nominally mandated.” 29 In fact,
the designation of CPCs amount to no more than sanctions and warnings. In addition, Farr
argues that today, no different than in 1998, diplomats lack knowledge or training concerning
the importance and meaning of religious freedom. Most diplomats continue to resist actively
promoting religious freedom. Farr adds that the IRFA “was essentially a humanitarian policy,
rather than a policy of promoting religious freedom.” 30 In other words, while sanctions are
used to influence the release of religious prisoners, they do not necessarily advance the right to
religious freedom. 31 The OIRF is largely considered a failure.
Currently, the Obama administration is criticized as having a poor religious freedom
record. As such, during the 2014 National Prayer Breakfast he adamantly affirmed his
continued commitment to religious freedom and faith-based partnerships. He stressed that
religious freedom is a key objective in foreign policy. In fact, religious freedom is one of the
objectives of the new State OFBCI. Unfortunately, Obama has failed to appoint a new
Ambassador-At-Large for International Religious Freedom in a timely manner. Leaving the
position vacant has signified a lack of concern for the plight of the religiously persecuted. Of
more interest may be the fact that this has led to public outrage; the protection of religious
rights in foreign nations is now conceived of as the responsibility of the U.S. government. =
Religious Engagement at the State Department
In the years leading up to the creation of the State Department OFBCI, debates about
religion and foreign policy increased. Independent task forces emerged all around the U.S. For
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example, in 2010, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs composed a report titled “Engaging
Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative in U.S. foreign policy.” Similarly, in the
same year, the President’s Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships
submitted their annual report of recommendations to the President. Among their many
recommendations, the Council advised for the creation of multi-religious working groups as
well as increased training about multi-religious cooperation in global affairs.
In an effort to develop new ideas and strategies for religious engagement, former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton developed a series of working groups and task forces. Among
the many working groups was included the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group. At the
launch of the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group in 2011, the Under Secretary for
Democracy and Global Affairs, Maria Otero, stated that religious engagement was now, more
than ever, necessary in foreign diplomacy. As was by then common rhetoric, religion had the
potential to change lives all around the world. In her enthusiastic speech she proclaimed, “For
those of us in this room today, we believe in religion as a force of good in the world -- and we
are here to see how we can better leverage it in the pursuit of a stronger society.” 32 It was, in
other words, time to put religion to its good use. In addition, she declared that this quality for
good was found in religions all around the world. In her own experience, “No matter where I
am, from Indonesia to Uganda, I am struck by the thread that unites the vast majority of the
world, a faith that is bound by hope and defined by love of family and our fellow man.” 33
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As these working groups developed their recommendations, the leaders at the State
Department began to actively promote a new culture of religious engagement. In 2012, based
on the recommendations of the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group, the Foreign
Service Institute offered—for the first time in its history—a three-day optional course on
religion and foreign policy. While it is merely optional and many diplomats opt-out, it does
indicate a forward approach concerning religion in foreign diplomacy. In addition to the
religions course, leaders began to hold public dialogues to endorse the importance of religious
engagement. For example, in January 2012, former Ambassador-At-Large for International
Religious Freedom, Suzanne Johnson Cook, held a “Conversation with America.” The topic was
the role of religion in U.S. foreign policy. During her interview she pointed out that that the
“key to all faiths is love thy neighbor as yourself … religious freedom is part of the American
DNA. And so it’s not a partisan issue. It’s a human issue…” 34 In addition, Chris Seiple—the
President of the Institute for Global Engagement and a member of the Religion and Foreign
Policy Working Group—said, “so the point of faith – good faith – is that you’re serving your
local community.” 35 In other words, true religion is distinctly attached to caring and humanistic
concerns.
Meanwhile, during her diplomatic trips abroad, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
increasingly engaged with religious leaders. In May 2012, at the annual Strategic Dialogue with
Civil Society, Secretary Clinton acknowledged that

34

Suzan Johnson Cook, “Role of Religion in U.S. Foreign Policy,” January 23, 2012. Accessed March 16, 2014.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/cwa/182470.htm
35
Chris Seiple, “Role of Religion in U.S. Foreign Policy,” January 23, 2012. Accessed March 16, 2014.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/cwa/182470.htm

20

our posts in every region of the globe work with faith-based organizations and religious
communities to bolster democracies, protect human rights, and respond to the
humanitarian need of citizens. So these groups are our natural allies on a multitude of
issues, including advancing religious freedom, and we want to work with them
wherever possible.” 36
In October 2012, the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group submitted their “White
Paper of the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group of the Secretary of State’s Strategic
Dialogue with Civil Society.” Of four major recommendations for how to engage religion, one
would eventually lead to the creation of the OFBCI.
The White Paper recommended the establishment of an official mechanism within
State for religious engagement. Specifically, to “create an institutionalized mechanism
through which the State Department and religious communities worldwide might better
communicate and potentially collaborate, and that will improve understanding of religious
dynamics relevant to foreign policy.” 37 According to the members of the working group, which
included the current Special Advisor to the OFBCI, “understanding religion is imperative to
understanding the local civil society.” 38 While they recognized that religion is a source for
conflict, they believe that “those same forces of faith contribute much good to civil society,
and when properly engaged can promote human progress and peaceful coexistence on a
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global scale.” 39 Of course, proper engagement is likely to be contingent with a particular
conception of religion.
THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES
Secretary of State John Kerry called the August 2013 launch of the State OFBCI a
“singular, historic initiative.” 40 Recounting his many engagements with faith community
members and leaders during his years as senator, he proudly acknowledged that “there is
much more that unites us, and should unite us, than divides us.” 41 The creation of the OFBCI is
meant to foster this understanding and strives to nurture the commonalities among faiths.
After all, according to John Kerry, “all of these faiths are virtuous, and they are in fact, most of
them, tied together by the golden rule, as well as fundamental concerns about the human
condition, about poverty, about relationships between people, our responsibilities to each
other. And they all come from the same heart.” 42
According to Kerry, it was time to translate this understanding of religion into action
and policy. It was now popularly understood that religions are inherently moral and concerned
with human dignity. As such, they were valuable partners in advancing development, human
rights, and aid. And while he recognized that there exist current offices concerned with issues
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related to religion, like the OIRF, he announced that the OFBCI “will grow our ability to reach
out to more communities and create greater understanding between peoples and countries.” 43
Shaun Casey, the Special Advisor to the OFBCI, followed Kerry’s speech at the launch.
Shaun Casey is a professor of theology at the Wesley Theological Seminary and teaches
Christian ethics. In addition, during the 2008 presidential campaign, Casey served as National
Evangelical Coordinator for the campaign’s faith-based community organizing. He is also a
member of the Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group that recommended the creation of
the OFBCI. During his speech at the launch he commended Kerry’s innovative approach to
religious engagement
I remember thinking how unusual it was for a public figure to see the potential in and
the power of religious groups tackling extreme poverty, convincing people to combat
global climate change, fighting for global human rights, mitigating conflict and building
peace, even at a time when others focused on those religious folk who committed acts
of violent extremism, perversely claiming justice in the name of their own faith. From
that day forward, I admired your willingness to defy the conventional wisdom that
dictated religion was a purely private, personal choice, and thus communities bounded
by faith must be entirely left outside discussions of policy. 44
During an interview with Paul Raushenbush in November 2013, Shaun Casey described
his position at the OFBCI as comprising of three jobs; first, to advise the Secretary concerning
the role of religion in particular issues; to build a systematic strategy for religious engagement
in the State; and third, to connect the State to faith-based groups and NGOs. 45 In addition,
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Casey has been a guest teacher for the Foreign Service Institute religions course. His
understanding and convictions concerning religion have been highly influential to the leaders
of the State Department and to the overall agenda of the OFBCI.
The State OFBCI has now been present for several months. And yet, besides the
occasional speech and meeting, which consist of the same language and content as always,
not much can be said of its accomplishments.
In August of 2013 the State Department announced three objectives in the creation of
the OFBCI. First, it hopes to “promote sustainable development and effective humanitarian
assistance.” This would include addressing issues of global poverty both at the national and
international level—through and with religious actors—“being mindful of the very important
religious aspects in the context where these programs are administered, we hope to overcome
some of the misunderstandings surroundings [U.S.] assistance.” 46 Second, they aim at
fostering “pluralism and human rights, including the right to religious freedom.” According to
the U.S. Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement, “the Administration
will increase efforts to engage a diverse spectrum of religious leaders on the advancement of
universal human rights, promoting core U.S. values like respect for human rights of members
in minority and marginalized groups, pluralism, tolerance, and sensitivity to and respect for the
beliefs and traditions of others.” 47 The idea is that the fulfillment of the right to religious
freedom and the promotion of tolerance and understanding will intrinsically support religiously
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diverse populations. Finally, the OFBCI will aim to “prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent
conflict and contribute to local and regional stability and security.” As the leaders involved in
the creation of this office have proposed, the “understanding” that comes from engaging
religious communities will inevitably decrease international conflicts with religious groups.
CONCLUSION
Although the OFBCI is a relatively recent development in the State Department, its
language shows continuity with the growing commitment to religious engagement within
government. As sociologist Rebecca Sager stated in her book Faith, Politics, and Power,
“policies are not just pieces of paper but ideas about larger meanings, recounted to the public
with the stamp of authority on them.” 48 The language used in the discourse on faith-based
initiatives suggests that religion is now legitimized as a source for promoting the common
good. In other words, religion is lauded as fostering universal virtues.
During the launch of the OFBCI, Secretary John Kerry admitted that, were he able to
return to college, he would major in comparative religion. In fact, I will argue in the next
chapter that much of the language used by the Department is inherited from the study of
comparative religion. As such, engaging the language used in the discourse on faith-based
initiatives through concepts in religious studies is appropriate. In the following chapter I will
argue and defend that the language presented in the discourse on faith-based initiatives
illustrates a commitment to a humanistic theology of religious pluralism.
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CHAPTER THREE:
A HUMANISTIC THEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
This chapter will argue and defend that the language that shapes the discourse on
faith-based initiatives, as introduced in chapter two, indicates a commitment to a humanistic
theology of religious pluralism. My thesis is that the State Department OFBCI uses the language
of a humanistic theology of religious pluralism to support U.S. foreign interests. As such, the
OFBCI will engage groups in so far as they fit their definition of religion. I will further argue that
using the language of a humanistic theology of religious pluralism obscures the exclusive and
coercive characteristics of faith-based initiatives. Or, more generally, I will argue that there is a
selective impulse concealed within the language of a humanistic theology of religious pluralism.
To return to the original question of “what will the U.S. State Department OFBCI
engage when they engage religion?” this chapter will respond by presenting a theoretical
framework for the language used in the discourse on faith-based initiatives. This chapter will
not present a list or catalogue all the religions of the world that will fall within the purview of
religious engagement. While all the speeches, public dialogues, and strategic meetings invoke
the concept of religion, or faith, typically synonymously, an explicit theoretical framework for
the initiative was never provided. As such, it seems more appropriate to answer the question of
“what will the U.S. State Department engage?” by establishing the theoretical framework
through which the OFBCI operates. However abstract the language spoken by the proponents
and architects of the OFBCI, I argue that its assumptions are inherited from the academic study
26

of religion; specifically, from the comparative study of religion. After all, J.Z. Smith once
claimed, “it is the study of religion that invented religion.” 49
The ambiguity of a theoretical framework in the launch of the OFBCI, then, does not
detract from the fact that there are inherent assumptions about religion supported in its
language. In other words, within the language used by the OFBCI—including the rhetoric on
faith-based initiatives in the years leading up to its creation—lays its theoretical assumptions.
Understanding these assumptions, their implications and limitations, can better answer the
question of “what will the U.S. engage?” than any extensive list could. After all, whom the
Department of State OFBCI legitimizes, protects, and ultimately engages with will be highly
dependent on discovering its theoretical assumptions concerning religion.
As stated in chapter one, most of the problems scholars have raised concerning the
State Department’s OFBCI are influenced by the contemporary academic debate on the
category of ‘religion.’ The critical approach to studying religion, currently influenced by
scholars like Daniel Dubuisson and Russell McCutcheon, are especially critical of the agenda of
comparative religion. Although there are no works by McCutcheon on faith-based initiatives,
the language in the discourse on faith-based initiatives contains the kind of universalizing
statements that McCutcheon finds problematic. While the works of Dubuisson and
McCutcheon will provide the majority of my argument, I will also apply the works of sociologist
Rebecca Sager and other representatives of the critical approach, including Pamela Klassen
and Benjamin Berger.
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Finally, a humanistic theology of religious pluralism is both a description and a critique of
the language promoted in the State OFBCI. It develops from two positions. First, humanistic
comes from the belief that the human person is progressive, rational, and morally driven.
Second, a theology of religious pluralism is derived from a critique by McCutcheon on the
enterprise of religious studies. Specifically, McCutcheon argues in his book Manufacturing
Religion that the comparativist approach to religion is “more akin to a theology of religious
pluralism than the academic study of religion.” 50 The critique of the political strategy of the
State OFBCI is ingrained in the use of humanistic theology of religious pluralism to describe its
theoretical framework. This chapter will explain and defend this argument.
A HUMANISTIC APPROACH TO RELIGION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
A humanistic approach to anything invokes imagery of the righteous social being
striving for a cause. The fight for human rights, the struggle for justice, the dedication to
human dignity for all—these are depicted as the particular values and motivations of the
human person. The optimism for a better tomorrow colors the humanistic approach. The
human person is envisioned as socially responsible, rational, compassionate, and just.
Anthropologist and historian of religion Daniel Dubuisson explains that, “the human being of
the human sciences is a basically reasonable, rationally motivated creature, who lives in a
rather hospitable world, which it is his duty to make better.” 51 In other words, a humanistic
approach sees the human being as inherently concerned with the common good and with
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effecting positive changes in the world. Moreover, “what is monstrous, violent, coarse, and
obscene in human beings escapes [humanistic approaches], along, logically, with everything
that devolves from it.” 52 The merciless is, then, not human; a mistake; a grave exception. In
short, it is inhumane.
The celebration of the religious person, and by extension ‘religion’, as virtuous and
actively engaged in social change is therefore indicative of a humanistic approach. Daniel
Dubuisson, in The Western Construction of Religion, argues that the human sciences are
responsible for the invention of homo religious—religious man. More importantly, he says, “this
human being, [is] progressively conceived of as free, tolerant, reasonable subject, committed
to happiness, attached to human rights and to democracy.” 53 Former U.S. Ambassador-AtLarge for International Religious Freedom, Suzan Johnson Cook represents it best when she
states that we should “recognize the human spirit of acceptance and love that runs through us
all.” 54
Russell McCutcheon explains in his article “It’s a Lie! There’s No Truth in It! It’s a Sin!: On
the Limits of the Humanistic Study of Religion and the Costs of Saving Others from
Themselves” that the humanistic approach to religion is “one that understands religion’s
significance—as well as the significance of the study of religion practiced as a form of
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conversation—to have something to do with its being both deeply human and humane.” 55 This
understanding embraces religion as humanitarian and as providing the religious person with an
ethical system particularly beneficial to reducing social problems and conflict. Furthermore,
the religious person is especially concerned with achieving the ethical goals of their religion for
the sake of the common good. As Kerry stated at the launch of the OFBCI, all religions have
“fundamental concerns about the human condition, about poverty, about relationships
between people, our responsibility to each other.” 56 Accordingly, all individuals, perhaps
especially religious individuals, are worthy of and supportive of, compassion, freedom, safety
and the fundamental necessities needed for a happy, fulfilling life.
An example of the humanistic approach to religion is, then, the promotion of faithbased initiatives. As seen in chapter one, the project of faith-based initiatives is linked with
participatory politics, in other words democracy, and the provision of social services. As Mary
Seger discusses in Faith-Based Initiatives and the Bush Administration, a “faith-based initiative
enforces the positive role of religion in society, recognizing that in many cases churches,
synagogues, and mosques are the only institutions able to ‘suffer with’ the poor and act as the
‘voice of the voiceless.’” 57 Although it is worth observing that religion is here associated with
institutions, the overall conviction is that faith-based initiatives, as manifestations of religion,
are compassionate and caring. Similarly, in their White Paper recommendations, the Religion
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and Foreign Policy Working Group endorsed religion as “a force for peace, human rights,
democracy, and development.” 58
As can be seen in chapter two, the State OFBCI and the overall discourse on faith-based
initiatives promotes the vision of religion as synonymous with morality, virtue, justice, and
peace. In other words, humanistic.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION AS ‘THEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM’
In the years leading up to the creation of the OFBCI there were many speeches
declaring the shared virtues and ethical commitments of all religions. President Obama and his
deliberative pluralistic democracy stressed this truth. 59 Unlike the Bush initiatives, he assured
that the White House OFBCI would be inclusive in honor of America’s spirit of pluralism. This
was especially poignant in his speeches which both assured that there were universal values in
all religions, and urged communities to find them. So, rather than the Bush initiative which was
often accused of exhibiting a partiality to Christian groups, the Obama administration
promised to build interfaith and intra-faith partnerships of mutual cooperation. More
importantly, he indicated that this was possible.
Again, although there was never any explicit mention of a particular theory or theorist
of religion, the language of the proponents is consistent throughout the years and alludes to a
mainstream conception of religion. Two specific themes will be the focus of this argument.
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First, “the challenge of simply understanding people,” the essential importance “to understand
them and to bring them into our diplomacy” and “to improve understanding of religious
dynamics relevant to foreign policy [italics mine].” 60 In the study of religion, understanding is a
loaded word—it is laden with the ideologies and traditions of the mid-twentieth century
American academic study of religion. An academic tradition represented by Mircea Eliade,
considered by some the father of religious studies. Second, the reference to the study of
comparative religions—both specifically during the launch of the OFBCI and implicitly in its
objectives—is suggestive of a particular theoretical framework. Today, scholars of religious
studies largely debate and critique the objectives and assumptions of that tradition.
According to Mircea Eliade, the unique purpose of the study of religion is that it should
seek to understand religion not explain it away. A proponent of the phenomenological
approach, Mircea Eliade claimed that religion was unique and therefore needed to be studied
by its own unique terms. Phenomenology comparatively and systematically tries to observe,
classify, describe and ultimately understand religious phenomena. The meaning of phenomena
is to manifest, to appear. As such, phenomenologists proper believe that religion is
autonomous and irreducible to fields such as psychology or economics. Neutrality, tolerance,
and understanding are part of the basis of phenomenology. As Eliade argued, to attempt to
explain religion away as the neurosis of the mind, or as the result of unsatisfactory economic
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conditions, is to ignore religion as a unique aspect of human experience; an experience that all
human beings have and which needs to be understood in its own terms.
The comparative approach to the study of religion can easily be coupled with the
attitude of the phenomenological approach which seeks to understand. In fact, Russell
McCutcheon has often argued that comparative religion is concerned with “unification through
essentialization” and the need to understand the Other. 61 According to this approach, to truly
understand the Other is to better understand yourself. In other words, comparative religion
abstracts features supposedly common to all religions in order to “learn about our own
religious nature.” 62 Thus, the comparative approach is critiqued by McCutcheon as being a
theology of religious pluralism in its concern with understanding, and perhaps legitimizing, our
own religious tradition in the face of others. It is concerned with the problem of religious
pluralism.
For Russell McCutcheon, the popular academic study of religion is devoid of theoretical
sophistication. Rather than a field concerned with the questions which originally called the
discipline into being, like what is the origin of religion, the study of religion has become a field
concerned with the politics of neutrality or the problem of religious pluralism. For example, the
United States, which sees itself as exceptional with regards to religious pluralism, promotes
the idea that all religions can co-exist under the guise of neutrality, tolerance, and inclusion;
the comparative approach supports this. In the words of McCutcheon, this approach envisions
that “socio-historical and material issues are not to be studied but are problems to be
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overcome, diffused, and minimalized for the sake of an abstract, ahistorical unity. The study of
religion conceived in this manner is the mediation of religious difference; it is a form of
religious pluralism; it is the discourse on sui generis yet again.” 63 The State OFBCI, then, if
operating under the conceptual framework of comparative religion, is also concerned with the
mediation of difference and the labor of unification.
Both the phenomenological drive to understand and the comparativist effort to find
common features have found their way into the language of faith-based initiatives. Shaun
Casey, the Special Advisor to the OFBCI, as a professor of Christian Ethics at Wesley
Theological Seminary, must have some experience with it. After all, he, along with those he
has advised concerning religion, applies the language often. In addition, that a Christian
theologian was chosen for the project of the OFBCI, seems to, in itself, warrant McCutcheon’s
criticisms that comparative religion is an ecumenical project; a theology of religious pluralism. 64
Finally, I argue that the theoretical framework of the State OFBCI is a humanistic
theology of religious pluralism. And more importantly, I argue that it is a problem.
A HUMANISTIC THEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AS POLITICAL STRATEGY:
OBSCURING THE FACTS
In spite of the years of preparation through public dialogues, working groups, and
strategy meetings, the launch of the OFBCI has raised many questions. Among them, the most
persistent question remains: what will the State OFBCI engage when they engage religion?
And to most scholars, the answer seems obvious and the question is posed rather rhetorically.
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After all, the State Department is first and foremost concerned with promoting the best
interest of the American people abroad. However admirable the objectives of the State
Department OFBCI might seem, there is no purely altruistic foreign policy. In other words, the
State Department OFBCI will engage religion in partnerships that are beneficial to U.S. foreign
interests. Again, it seems obvious and possibly should go without saying. So perhaps the
question remains because the discourse on faith-based initiatives continues to claim
otherwise. Or perhaps it is simply because it is not clear and explicit. It was just this February
that President Obama, speaking of both the White House OFBCI and the new State
Department OFBCI at the 2014 National Prayer Breakfast, urged that “in contrast to those who
wield religion to divide us, let’s do more to nurture the dialogue between faiths that can break
cycles of conflict and build true peace…” 65
In continuously stating the question, scholars are rather than being genuinely curious,
recognizing that there is a problem. They are recognizing that the religious engagements
promoted by the U.S. State Department OFBCI are invariably limited. More importantly, they
identify that the discourse on faith-based initiatives obscures this truth. What is obvious, then,
is hidden. And this is what leads to the ever-pressing question: what will the State
Department’s Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives actually engage?
My thesis is that the State Department OFBCI uses the language of a humanistic
theology of religious pluralism to support U.S. foreign interests. In other words, religious groups
will be engaged and legitimized so far as they both represent and pursue the common good.
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The language used in the discourse on faith-based initiatives makes this openly clear. So, the
conceptual framework of a humanistic theology of religious pluralism becomes an issue of
definition for religious engagements. Groups will be defined according to this humanistic
theology of religious pluralism. And yet, the use of language that promotes a humanistic
theology of religious pluralism obscures its limitations. As international affairs scholars Lee
Marsden has explained, “The attempts by faith-based scholars […] to inspire a faith-based US
foreign policy emphasize the inclusivity of faith-based approaches. In doing so they
presuppose a religious community that is prepared to work in inter- and multi-faith forums to
an ecumenical agenda based on mutual understanding […]” 66 So, the language of a humanistic
theology of religious pluralism, is a concealed strategy that obscures the exclusive and coercive
potential of government institutionalized faith-based initiative.
Taking religion seriously
The creation of the State OFBCI is meant to respond to demands, both foreign and
domestic, that religion be taken seriously in U.S. foreign policy. The events of 9/11, the Arab
Spring, and the continuing conflicts abroad have encouraged the recognition of religion as
something worth engaging. The objectives of the OFBCI are, then, the promotion and
advancement of democratically conceived-of ideals such as development, pluralism, human
rights, security, and stability. Religious engagement at the State Department is meant to
advance these ideals through what is now recognized as the true potential of religion. The
OFBCI strives to build global collaborative partnerships between the U.S. government and
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foreign religious groups. It is, in short, in the efforts to advance U.S. foreign interests. As such,
religion is defined through the lens of those democratically conceived ideals.
During the launch of the OFBCI, Secretary of State John Kerry confessed that “we
ignore religion at our peril.” More specifically, to ignore religion has two major possibilities.
One, religion can be abused. This comes from the understanding that there are those who will,
and have, abused of religion for extremist and hostile reasons. These groups are not true
religions, so the thinking goes, but distortions of a religion. The U.S. government recognizes
that engaging religion is somewhat of a preemptive solution to extremism and terrorism born
abroad. It has been suggested by leaders that were the U.S. not to engage with these religious
groups, someone else would; mainly, political extremists who would abuse and misinterpret
the truth of religion. Second, to ignore religion is to ignore its powerful potential and force for
advancing global progress. In the conceptual framework of a humanistic theology of religious
pluralism, a religion is defined by its commitment to morality, compassion, and an ethic of
service. So, those religious groups that the U.S. engages with are, and must remain, consistent
with a conception of religion that promotes the common good. Those religions that the OFBCI
ignores, or fails to engage with, are invariably understood as examples of bad religion, but
more specifically, false religion. Like Chris Seiple, member of the Religion and Foreign Policy,
claimed in his “Conversation with America,” the point of faith is for it to be good. The OFBCI
commitment to religious engagements in foreign affairs addresses both these possibilities by
taking religion seriously.
In Manufacturing of Religion, McCutcheon argues that the category of religion is not
simply the product of processes of academia but is both constructed and used for material
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interests. So while a humanistic theology of religious pluralism is a conceptual framework
present in the language of the initiative, it is language specifically selected and put to a
particular use. Categories are first produced, accepted, and then managed. To engage religion
is to engage a particular understanding of religion. Religion is a useful category. Meredith
McGuire, in her popular textbook Religion: The Social Context, in addressing different
definitions of religion, admits as such. She argues that a definition of religion is a strategy.
Used as a political strategy, religion in faith-based initiatives takes the U.S. democratic
agenda, and imposes it on the definition of religion. In the case of the OFBCI, its objectives and
language suggests that a humanistic theology of religious pluralism is, in addition to the
theoretical framework it operates within, the strategy of religious engagement in the State
Department.
In an article titled, “Seriously, What Does Taking Religion Seriously Mean?,”Elizabeth
Pritchard analyzed popular demands that things be “taken seriously.” From gender, to race, to
religion, Pritchard argues that taking these concepts seriously is merely to legitimize a
particular definition of them. In the case of religion, that religion needs to be taken seriously in
the public sphere invariably means that religion needs to be welcomed; but even these claims
often explicitly recognize limitations to the understanding of religion. For example, as
Formicola acknowledges in the Bush Initiative: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, initials requests
that religion in the public sphere be taken seriously always conceded that it needed to be done
within the confines of the Establishment Clause. So while religion is understood as a force for
good that needed to be acknowledged, it is bound by specific rules. So, as Pritchard concludes,
“even as religion is courted into the public square, its presence there is already constrained and
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qualified in advance.” 67 Institutionalized engagement of religions, whether through funding or
cooperation, with all its caveats and concessions, appears to be the engagement of a very
specific understanding of religion.
The theoretical assumptions evidenced in the language of the State OFBCI suggest that
the limits for the category of religion in foreign engagements lie within the confines of U.S.
interests. In the language of “understanding” and universal values, according to McCutcheon,
there is an imperialistic impulse. Specifically, he writes, “such expressions as “world
understanding” and references to such abstract constructions as “global” or “universalizing
cultures” can therefore function as euphemisms for domination—as a domination that is
ultimately blameless, for we are passive, having been “impelled” to take such courses of
action.” 68 In other words, alliances are made through a framework that suggestively assumes
common values and interests. Formicola, in referencing the domestic OFBCI, argues that
“governments are tempted to use religions to support their own legitimacy and, often with the
best of intentions, to utilize the moral authority and outreach of religions to solve social
problems.” 69 Of course, in the case of foreign engagements it is not just U.S. interests that are
legitimized but the religious groups engaged as well.
The problem of religious pluralism
Charged with advancing U.S. interests in foreign policy, the State Department must
negotiate American principles in diverse global situations. While in faith-based initiatives,
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particularly in the Obama administration, diversity is promoted as strength—in reality
differences must be managed. As the OFBCI carries out its mission, one of which is the
promotion of religious pluralism, a history of American imperialism may shadow the initiative.
Such a history, coupled with a humanistic theology of religious pluralism, implicates that the
OFBCI may be selective and coercive in its religious engagements.
As Courtney Bender states in “The Habits of Pluralism,” “the guise of religious
pluralism, in which a multiplicity of individuals and communities recognize each other as
parallel forms of the phenomenon called religion” 70 operates with the idea that all religions can
be treated as equals. In other words, it suggests that religious pluralism is inclusive. Within the
promotion of religious pluralism is the idea that a tolerant and inclusive society is more
progressive and successful. However, a commitment to a humanistic theology of religious
pluralism would only legitimize religion so far as it displays evidence of a humanistic impulse
similar to that of the Good Samaritan in Christianity. 71 So, such a theoretical framework is
preemptively selective. If at the launch of the OFBCI religions were presented as being “tied
together by the golden rule, as well as fundamental concerns about the human condition,”
then only those religions that display those qualities will be selected for engagement in foreign
affairs. The OFBCI is, then, selective, rather than wholly inclusive.
During a recent interview, Shaun Casey claimed that “we’re going to talk to anybody
who’s willing to talk to us. We’re not going to turn folks away because somehow they’re on a
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nonexistent hypothetical list…” 72 However, the U.S. does have lists of groups it considers
terrorist groups or extremist groups. Often these groups are depicted as abusing of a particular
religion. In recent events, it has been Islam “taken hostage” by political extremists. The
understanding of a good religion and a bad religion limits religious engagements. After all,
“how pluralist assumptions and pluralist logics shape modes of public engagement and the
various religious and nonreligious subjects that can take part within them” vary depending on
the objectives. 73 If the agenda is to promote humanitarian interventions and conflict
resolution, then only those religious groups that will aid in fostering those goals will be
selected or accepted for engagement. Those religious groups that question the goals of the
initiative, or question religious pluralism as a good, will be excluded and, by extension,
delegitimized. In other words, while religious pluralism, in principle, is inclusive, it is rather
selective and exclusive depending on the particular conception of religion that is projected. In
the case of the OFBCI, the goals of religious engagement abroad are “in stark contrast to
violent extremists who seek to destroy.” 74
Although the State OFBCI is promoting religious pluralism abroad, the standard of
religious pluralism in the U.S. has often had the effect of coercing religious traditions to adapt
to the normative definition of religion. There is a limit to religious pluralism and in a
competitively religious environment, this limit may influence modifications. In America, the
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competitive religious environment pressures religions to develop or adapt the organizational
structure essential for the successful growth of their communities. This reveals that although
an environment of religious pluralism may be beneficial for some religious communities, it can
also tend to cultivate normalization among others. Bender states that “the language of
religious pluralism always embeds a normative goal: It is not merely descriptive of varieties but
indicative of the proper relations that should take place between them.” 75 Coercion can take
the form of imposing a norm for the sake of participation. For those religious groups abroad
that see U.S. government collaboration as a necessity, adaptation to the initiatives conception
of religion may seem essential. Courtney Bender in the collaborative book After Pluralism:
Reimagining Religious Engagement, notes that “our labors take shape in the wake of an
ideology of pluralism that articulates and naturalizes the very boundaries of differences that it
seeks to diminish, overcomes, or mediate.” 76 So, if a religion is too different, it can “overcome”
this difference by adapting.
It is possible to describe the limit of religious pluralism as the proper distance a religion
has between itself and Christian, specifically Protestant, norms. This is an example of the
imperialistic impulse in the Western category of religion and specifically in a humanistic
theology of religious pluralism. Stray too far from Western norms of religion and the values of
religious pluralism—strength in multiplicity—becomes a disadvantage. As Klassen and Bender
observe, “the critique of normativity asks us to consider the ways norms and power relations
contribute to the construction and defense of … hierarchies, whether we are speaking of
75

CourtneyBender and Pamela E. Klassen, After Pluralism: Reimagining Religious Engagement, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2010), 19.
76
Ibid., 15.

42

individual human beings or of the autonomous religious communities presumed to be the basis
of religious pluralism.” 77 While in diversity there can be strength, the strength of religious
communities abroad will be in their relation to a Western conception of religion. There is a
relationship between the different and the norm that must be balanced. There is a standard or
center from which the distance, by others, is measured. More specifically, there is a concealed
conception of legitimacy among certain groups. In order to be legitimized, a religious group
must remain within the limits or boundaries of the conceptual framework of a humanistic
theology of religious pluralism.
Finally, the problem of religious pluralism is that it operates with a specific conception
of religion. The belief of religious pluralism advocates inclusion but can also support exclusion
and coercion. Once the limit within the conceptual framework of a humanistic theology of
pluralism is reached, inclusion is checked and becomes exclusion. So while religious pluralism
may foster inclusion of all religions, a religion is bound by certain characteristics and is thus,
selective. These certain characteristics are the norm. To be included you either adapt or adopt.
In other words, there are certain prerequisites to inclusion. The language used in the discourse
on faith-based initiatives suggests that religious engagement at the State Department will
within these limitations.
CONCLUSION
As Richard Wood noted in his book Faith in Action, the question of whether religion
should or should not be engaged with by the government is not the important question.
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Rather, the question should be how and to what political ends. In order to answer those
questions, the theoretical assumptions of faith-based initiatives, particular those
institutionalized within government, must be understood. I have here argued that the
language used within the discourse of faith-based initiatives suggests a commitment to a
humanistic theology of religious pluralism. The implications of such a commitment are that
religion, as a category, is limited to a Christian, particularly Western, normativity. Religion in
the OFBCI, in this sense, is a selective, strategic category. It is only a true religion if it is a good
religion; if it displays qualities of humanitarianism and moral virtues that can unify then, and
only then, does it have potential for engagement. However, if religious groups abroad desire to
be engaged with, and subsequently legitimized, they may adapt to fit the necessary standards.
In that regards, a humanistic theology of religious pluralism is also a coercive category.
While the State Department, and most governmental agencies, does not make a
conceptual framework of religion explicit, the language is suggestive. Although there is an
imperialistic impulse in a humanistic theology of religious pluralism, I do not argue that it is
insidious. However, its ambiguity may appear sinister in places where U.S. intentions are held
suspiciously. As an article on Al Jazeera America titled “Losing Faith in Faith-Based Initiatives”
noted “governmental religious-outreach programs operate on the assumption that all religions
can be treated equally. This can only be a pretense that masks power relations: the religions of
the majority, of the orthodox, of the ruling class, of allies of the United States, the United
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Nations, corporate interests or some other power broker will inevitably carry some political
weight than others.” 78
In the end, the question ‘what will the U.S. engage when they engage religion?’ can be
most thoroughly answered by understanding that the theoretical framework of the OFBCI
assumes, and expects, that religion display humanistic values.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
CONCLUSION
Federal agencies at every level implemented a faith-based initiative long before the
State Department finally decided to institutionalize religious engagements in 2013. As such,
the media hype that followed the introduction of the U.S Department of State OFBCI derived
from the notion that religious engagement in foreign affairs was a novel and rather
unprecedented commitment. In the wake of its creation, articles sensationalized the inclusion
of religion into American foreign affairs through titles such as “How the State Department is
getting religion” and “The State Department’s great leap faithward.” 79 Such titles and musings
gave the impression that the creation of the OFBCI, but more importantly its objectives, was
marked by a new approach to religion in foreign affairs. After all, the long history of the State
Department has seemingly warranted the accusations of “religion avoidance syndrome.”
However, such a view is rather simplistic.
It has been several decades now that the U.S. government has acknowledged, or
perhaps validated, the importance in collaborating with religious. Former President George
Bush believed there was positive potential in engaging faith communities for social change. As
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a result in 2001 he institutionalized, for the first time, faith-based initiatives in our domestic
governmental agencies.
However, the original launch of the White House OFBCI wholly disregarded the
limitations and obstacles in faith-based initiatives. 80 More importantly, the first governmental
effort at engaging faith communities was unprepared for the difficulties in engaging with such
a volatile word as is religion. I have argued throughout this thesis that the limitations, and
subsequent problems, of our institutionalized faith-based initiatives are significantly
influenced by theoretical assumptions concerning religion. In addition, it is these theoretical
assumptions that considerably determine what religions the U.S. will be willing to engage in
faith-based initiatives.
In chapter two, the decades leading up to the creation of the State OFBCI presented a
more nuanced picture of the inclusion of religion in our foreign affairs agency. Rather than
merely understanding the State OFBCI as a novel office concerned with engaging religion in
foreign affairs, chapter two presented the language which is common to U.S. governmentally
institutionalized faith-based initiatives. Statements such as “we believe in religion as a force
good in the world -- and we are here to see how we can better leverage it in the pursuit of a
stronger society -- a society that is unified in progress rather than divided by difference” have
been consistent since the Bush White House OFBCI was created.81 While the office may be
novel, the rhetorical language used in the launch and subsequent publicity of the State OFBCI
relies on the same assumptions and assertions typical of our domestic faith-based efforts. The
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contemporary discourse of faith-based initiatives in the U.S. government continues to avoid
explicit theoretical reflections while simultaneously claiming to address the limitations of past
faith-based efforts.
The Obama administration specifically claims to address the shortcomings of the Bush
administration; mainly it claims to be deliberately concerned with honoring America’s religious
pluralism. I have argued that this concern with pluralism, while manifested more explicitly in
the Obama administration than in the original Bush initiatives, marks continuity with the
implicit theoretical tradition concerning religion found in the government’s earliest shift
towards faith-based collaborations. Although the domestic Bush initiative was un-excusably
and rather blatantly biased towards Christian organizations, the Obama initiatives cannot help
but function with that same Christian normativity. In other words, “rather than letting the
chips, gaps, and chasms fall where they may, the possibility of dissent and conflict is
preempted in advance” in the deliberative concern with religious pluralism. The attention to
inclusiveness and diversity is, in other words, still operating under the same border control that
the category of religion, as understood in American politics, supports. The conception of
religion in both administrations remains the same; however, while the earlier initiatives were
rather blatantly exclusive, the Obama initiatives obscure this fact.
The language in the discourse of faith-based initiatives suggests that the U.S.
Department of State OFBCI is committed to a humanistic theology of religious pluralism. While
the political culture concerning faith has changed significantly—both in our domestic and
foreign politics—the popular, traditional conception of religion remains the same. In chapter
three I focus on the problems of this academic tradition particularly as it influences the
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strategy and systemizing of our foreign faith-based initiative. Examining the language used to
announce and support the State Department OFBCI yields rhetoric consistent with the
comparative approach to religion in religious studies. This early and problematic approach to
religion is conceived of and invented by Western academia. As such, a faith-based initiative in
our foreign affairs agency merely universalizes a Western construct. More specifically, when
this theoretical tradition becomes institutionalized in government agencies, it gives the U.S.
government the power to authenticate and legitimize a particular religion by its willingness to
engage with it. Likewise, it invalidates those groups it ignores.
Although there is a growing amount of literature on faith-based initiatives, they are
mostly concentrated in the fields of political science and sociology. In addition, these studies
tend to ignore or merely superficially address the theoretical assumptions concerning religion,
as a category, involved in these initiatives. An institution, particularly one concerned with
politics and religion, that neglects theoretical and methodological reflections will inevitably fail
or create conflict where it meant to prevent it. Although the State Department OFBCI is
ambiguous concerning its theoretical foundation, its ideas concerning religion do not exist in a
vacuum. In order to understand the State OFBCI and, more generally, religious engagements
in foreign affairs, a better understanding of the theory which influences it must be achieved.

MOVING FORWARD
As chapter two illustrated, the general view of our contemporary faith-based initiatives
is that “we have seen a shift in dialogue towards mutuality and partnership with religious
communities. We have challenged discrimination and intolerance, and fought to protect
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religious freedom, both at home and abroad.” 82 While this thesis does not argue the potential
of engaging with religious communities, it does challenge the government’s ability to
successfully tap into said potential without serious theoretical reflection. While the field of
religious studies has begun to question the traditional study of comparative religion, the
proponents and creators of the State OFBCI leave theory significantly neglected and
ambiguous while still operating within its boundaries. In doing so, they do the so-called
potential of the initiatives a disservice. They will remain wasted potential until religion, as a
category, is taken seriously.
In 2006, the American Political Science Review published an article titled “Getting
Religion: Has political science rediscovered the faith factor?” In this article, political scientists
Wald and Wilcox used the publications of a popular political science journal, theReview, to
measure the neglect of religion in the study of politics. They found that, in general, the topic of
religion was very limited in its publications and that the few articles that were published with a
reference to religion were mostly concerned with political philosophy and public law. 83 In other
words, religion was a marginal topic of study in political science. Yet, while their findings
suggested that religion had been historically ignored and underestimated in political science,
they argued that this was due to the origins of the discipline rather than to any systemic
hostility. As faith-based initiatives become more prominent and established at all levels of
government agencies, the study of religion in political science will be all the more necessary
and important. The U.S. government should be fostering and welcoming the inclusion of these
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studies, particularly those theoretically concerned, within the strategy and education of faithbased initiatives and its foreign advocates.
In “Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics,” Eva Bellin argues
that there is plenty of literature illustrating the role of religion in international relations for
matters of conflict and conflict resolution. However, these studies, according to the article,
were completed in fields outside political science, such as history, sociology, and theology. 84
According to Bellin, “the problem is not that the question of religion has been overlooked in
international affairs so much as that it has been undertheorized.” 85 It is this issue of lacking
theoretical reflections that must be addressed both within the academic study of foreign
affairs but also within the institutional manifestations of religious engagements.
Timothy Shah in Rethinking Religion in World Affairs explains that “much classical
thinking and practice in world affairs is… a form of border patrol.” 86 Political scholars have
historically endeavored to maintain a strict separation between the secular and the religious,
both in study and in practice. Now that this separation has been breached in the practice of
institutionalizing faith-based initiatives, it is time for multi-disciplinary considerations
concerning the category of religion. In his chapter “Why Religion? Why Now?” J. Bryan Hehir
explains as much. He writes, “the operative assumption has been that the influence of
religious beliefs and communities on “high politics” is so marginal—and so opaque—that one
can safely ignore religion altogether and still successfully interpret the international system
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and the policies of states.” 87 However, this assumption is no longer viable. It is arguable that it
was never truly viable.
For example, during the Iranian Revolution of the 1970s, an analysis that suggested
religion as the basis for the violent conflict and general animosity towards western powers was
dismissed by the CIA as “sociology.” 88 Put simply, irrelevant. And so, religion was neglected at
all levels of political discourse, including international relations. But, unquestionably, it was
present.
Now that a relationship between faith communities and government agencies has been
legitimized, the move towards religious engagements must be seriously concerned with
theoretical reflections. In addition, these theoretical reflections must not be bound by any
specific discipline; they must be advanced across disciplines.
In chapter three I presented the ways that the critical approach in religious studies can
unearth the possibility of conflict and limitations in the State Department OFBCI. Specifically,
approaching the State Department OFBCI through the critical approach of religion, I argued
that it was committed to a humanistic theology of religious pluralism. The criticisms are not
meant to disparage the potential of faith-based initiatives. Rather, armed with the awareness
of these potential limitations and problems, the foreign diplomats engaging with religious
communities can preempt and more effectively strategize against conflict and
misunderstanding. It is armed with intelligence that the objectives of the OFBCI can be
accomplished.
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Theoretical reflection is the missing step in the shift towards institutionalized
government and faith-based collaborations. If religion is to be taken seriously, faith-based
initiatives must critically reflect on the systems of powers our specific conception of religion
projects. A commitment to a humanistic theology of religious pluralism may potentially reflect
systems of power—both exclusive and coercive—that, rather than nurture understanding and
progress, creates undue conflict and animosity. Theory is the key to understanding how to
approach and strategize for successful, result-driven religious engagements. Transparency in
theoretical traditions must be present. Lee Marsden has criticized that “advocates of a faith
based approach to US foreign policy rely heavily on anecdotal rather than empirical
evidence.” 89 In order to effectively promote faith-based initiatives, and dissuade still-present
skepticism, the U.S. government should show that it is not merely playing with words, but
intellectually engaging with them. The State Department should shift to execute what the U.S.
government’s domestic faith-based initiatives have consistently failed to do—theoretically
engage with the words it constantly embraces.
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